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Abstract—We conducted a large-scale online study with 26,000
software installations during which we asked user (participants)
whether they wanted to enable or disable the detection of
Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs – potentially malicious
software, such as adware or spyware). PUAs are notoriously
difficult to manage, e.g., legal challenges can preclude default
options that could otherwise be set for PUAs detection or removal.
Our study was performed with an IT security software provider
(ESET) who gave us access to the participants (antivirus product
beta users). We used a between-subjects design with 15 condi-
tions (a starting-point control interface, and 14 new “warning”
interfaces). Despite the fact that many software companies (e.g.,
Microsoft, AVAST, AVG, McAfee, Kaspersky Lab) are struggling
with PUAs detection, there are few studies focused on this topic.
Our results indicate a strong desire for PUAs detection
by users. In particular, enabling PUAs detection was chosen
by 74.5% of our participants for our initial control interface.
Further, a modified interface in which the option to enable PUAs
detection was presented first resulted in 89.8% of participants
choosing to enable PUAs detection (a statistically significant
increase from the control).
I. INTRODUCTION
A potentially unwanted application (PUA) is software,
such as adware or spyware, that can collect information
about users [1]. PUAs are traditionally installed locally on a
user’s machine, though they can also operate via web-based
mechanisms, for example using cross-site scripting [2]. Like
malware, PUAs use computing resources, such as memory,
processes and networks, and can also have a negative im-
pact on user privacy, e.g., by collecting information such as
page interactions and search queries. While malware is often
deemed more malicious (e.g., supporting fraud, theft, denial-
of-service), the direct results of PUAs are typically perceived
as more benign and (legally or ethically) ambiguous. For
this reason, PUAs are sometimes referred to as greyware [3].
While malware is typically subjected to automatic removal,
the removal of PUAs will often depend upon the choice of a
user [4].
While there has been a significant focus on malware over
the years (e.g., [5], [6], [7]), there has been less focus on
PUAs. Furnell et al. [8] highlight the impact that this has
in terms of properly quantifying cybercrime, for example.
However, recent research has provided an excellent first step,
with a comprehensive analysis of the means and scale of
adware injection [2]. Yet despite the fact that many software
companies (such as Microsoft [9], AVAST [10], AVG [11],
McAfee [12] and Kaspersky Lab [13]) are dealing with PUAs
detection warnings, there appears to be no other study focused
on this topic. In our paper, recognizing the importance of user
involvement in deciding whether to accept a PUAs detection
or not, we focus on the impact of warning interfaces for
encouraging users to enable the detection of PUAs.
Deciding whether to enable PUAs detection is conceptually
similar to other activities, such as controlling malware in-
stallation [14], evaluating whether mobile applications respect
privacy [15], updating software [16] and click-through agree-
ments [17], as each encourages a user to make an informed
decision. Though due to the dubious legal standing of PUAs
and their arguably lower risk (compared to malware) [18], it
can be challenging to describe the threat of PUAs to users. For
example, since the developers of PUAs actively defend their
products, PUAs installation warnings that are overly biased
(against their installation) can provoke legal challenges [3].
In this paper we report on a large-scale online study with
26,000 software installations in which we evaluated the effec-
tiveness of a set of “unbiased warning” (i.e., warnings without
intentionally stressed options) interfaces that asked participants
(who were in the process of installing their antivirus soft-
ware) whether they wanted to enable a feature that would
thereafter detect the installation of PUAs.1 Our designs were
“unbiased” in the sense that we tried to present information
and choices using non-judgemental language with regard to the
acceptability of PUAs. Our goal was to increase the number
of participants who enabled PUA detection when compared to
the starting-point control interface. We were somewhat limited
in the scale of interface changes that we could make (note that
these changes were made to the live system of our industry
partner) so that more comprehensive changes were not possible
for this experiment. Our interface designs and the evaluation
study were performed in cooperation with the IT security
software provider ESET who provided access to the study
participants (antivirus product beta testers). Our 15 interface
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variations were based on four categories of warning features,
namely (i) use of simple, jargon-free descriptions, (ii) warning
images, (iii) enhanced text, such as with colour or bolding, and
(iv) altering the order of option choices. Our reported results
are quantitative and consist of the number of participants that
decided to enable the PUAs detection feature (or not) for each
of the interface variations.
In Section II we describe the related work in the area of
warning design. Section III introduces principles and variables
used during the design of proposed variants and also specifies
the experiment design. Section IV explains the most significant
experiment findings, while Section V discusses further obser-
vations. We conclude in Section VI. The appendix contains all
proposed variants of PUAs detection user dialogs.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work on security warnings tends to focus on either
the content of the warning or the presentation of the warning.
The end goal is to increase either adherence to a warning, or
comprehension of the warning or its potential impacts. In some
cases, where there are repeated requests for a user to respond
to a warning, factors such as habituation are considered. While
habituation does become an issue when managing each indi-
vidual PUA, in this paper we focus primarily on the decision
to enable (or not) a PUAs detection feature during one-time
installation. Habitual choices related to each PUA acceptance
decision will be considered in our future studies. In terms of
warning message, there are conflicting results regarding the
effectiveness of detailed explanations. Bravo-Lillo et al. [19]
showed that a detailed explanation did not work well as an
attractor in an experiment with other attractors (such as the
use of pictorial symbols, colours, framing, etc.). Whereas Tan
et al. [20] found that warning with a “purpose string” has a
higher (but still not statistically significant) impact on a user
over a warning without any purpose. Providing an example
makes users pay more attention and consequently make more
risk-aware choices [21].
Text structure may enhance readability too. Warning text
in bullets or in an outline form is considered more readable
than continuous text [22]. Use of simple language is also
recommended. In terms of warning presentation, graphical
improvements are often used to catch users’ attention. For
example, users are more likely to read salient, eye-catching
warnings [23].
Wogalter et al. [24] note that warning visibility and read-
ability can be enhanced by large or bold print that contrasts
with the standard type and by adding signal colours, borders
and special effects like flashing lights. User’s comprehension
can be increased also by adding pictorials to the warning
[25]. Signal safety words, for example “Warning”, “Danger”,
“Caution” or “Notice” also increase users’ perceptions of a
potentially risky situation [26].
Aspects such as colour, option order and pictorials have
recently been used to slightly influence, or “nudge” users to use
more secure options. For example, Turland et al. [27] designed
a prototype for nudging users to select more secure wireless
access points. Option order (the secure option comes first),
option colour and the effect of pictorials were tested. There
was a significant increase in choosing safer options depending
on the colour of options, and their order, though a padlock
pictorial had a negative impact (it tended to puzzle users).
Felt et al. [28] recently redesigned Google Chrome’s SSL
warning and tested the proposals with microsurveys and a field
study. They used simple language, avoided technical jargon,
targeted wording to a low reading level, and provided a short
description. Despite using such (previously recommended)
design features, they failed in designing a comprehensible
warning, though they did increase adherence. The use of
pictorial symbols and contrasting colours (yellow and gray)
were main parts of the new design. In particular, the variant
with a gray background and simple, jargon-free text had the
best performance.
Other techniques such as persuasion [29] have also been
used in computer security, such as for improving password
choices, and anti-virus behaviour [30], [31]. There is also
design example in which users are encouraged to update their
first password choice by adding new characters [30].
III. INTERFACE DESIGN AND EVALUATION
A. Interface Design
For our studies, we used a baseline interface (see Fig.
1) that contained a short paragraph with a brief explanation
of PUAs detection importance. “ESET can detect potentially
unwanted applications and ask for confirmation before they
install. Potentially unwanted applications might not pose se-
curity risk but they can affect computer’s performance, speed
and reliability, or cause changes in behavior. They usually
require user’s consent before installation.” People show their
agreement by picking an option “Disable detection of po-
tentially unwanted applications.” or by choosing other option
“Enable detection of potentially unwanted applications.” To
avoid potential legal challenges related to setting a default “en-
able detection” option, our interface designs used unchecked
‘radio buttons’ so that participants were required to choose
one of the two options. There is one more user dialog that
appears on the same screen that asks users to join “LiveGrid”2.
Drawing on previous work on security warnings we tested
14 variations from the control interface that alter features
such as the warning description (e.g., with hyperlinks, bullets)
or presentation (e.g., with images, bolding, simple language,
option order). We observed whether the application of these
techniques to enabling PUAs detection had positive or negative
effects on user adherence, when compared to their use for other
warning purposes.
Changes we made may seem subtle, but a conceptual
redesign was out of question due to several limitations imposed
by the company. However, we feel that even with our “subtle”
changes we were able to incorporate some traditional warning
design features.
Newly designed variants (marked A-N) are described in
Appendix and are summarized in Table I along with their
corresponding variant label. The interfaces of Variants A to K
are shown in Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix as they would
have been viewed by our study participants (the LiveGrid
portion of the screen is not shown in these images due to
2ESET LiveGrid collects data submitted by ESET users worldwide and
sends it to their malware research labs for analysis [32].
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Var. Description
Control Text description with “Disable detection”, then “Enable detection”(see Fig. 1).
A Option order reversed: “Enable detection”, then “Disable detection”.
B Option text changed: from “Don’t detect” to “Detect”.
C Option text changed & reversed: Combines A and B.
D Added hyperlink: “What is a potentially unwanted application?”
E Added hyperlink: “Why do we ask?”
F Added hyperlink & no text description: “What is a PUA?”
G Added warning image: Warning image provided by the company.
H Added warning image: ANSI warning triangle.
I Added example: Added a practical example to end of description.
J Coloured warning text: Added red Notice to start of text description.
K Bulleted text: Text description bulleted, with partial bolding.
L LiveGrid user dialog: LiveGrid user dialog removed from the screen.
M Hyperlink, bulleted text, & option text changed: Combines B, D, K.
N Combination B, D, K, L.
TABLE I. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF TESTED VARIANTS. SEE FIGS 2 AND 3 FOR SCREEN IMAGES OF VARIANTS A TO K.
space constraints). Although the LiveGrid is strictly separate
to our experiment, we wanted to investigate it’s impact on our
participants, hence Variants L and N do not include LiveGrid
user dialog on the same screen as the PUAs detection user
dialog.
Fig. 1. The starting-point control variant.
1) Option order and language: In order to investigate the
impact of changing options from the starting-point variant, we
used three variants. In the first one, the order of the options
was simply reversed (A in Fig. 2) so that “Enable detection
of PUAs.” came first and “Disable detection of PUAs.” was
second. In the second variant, we changed the wording so that
“Disable detection of PUAs.” became “Don’t detect PUAs.”
and “Enable detection of PUAs.” became simply “Detect
PUAs” (B in Fig. 2). Since the formulation “Detect PUAs”
is shorter and more straightforward than “Enable detection of
PUAs”, we had anticipated (based on previous research [28])
that variant B would increase the success rate. For the third
variant, we reversed the order with the new wording to give the
option of “Detect PUAs.” first, and then “Don’t detect PUAs.”
(C in Fig. 2). It is a combination of variants A and B.
2) Hyperlink: The role of explanation in warning design
is still unclear. We wanted to investigate this issue so we
designed three variants (D, E, F in Fig. 2) with a hyperlink
connecting to the company website where a detailed PUAs
explanation is provided. Variants D (Fig. 2) and E (Fig. 2)
differ only in a text formulation of the hyperlink. Variant D
(Fig. 2) states “What is a potentially unwanted application?”,
whereas variant E (Fig. 2) is “Why do we ask?” Variant F (Fig.
2) contains the hyperlink with the text “What is a potentially
unwanted application?” but without the whole explanatory
paragraph. The main aim of this variant was to investigate
whether participants are influenced by moving the explanation
from the warning body to an external web page or not.
3) Pictorials: Since related work considers pictures, picto-
rials or alert signs to be powerful attractors, we wanted to test
this assumption also for the PUAs detection issue. We designed
two variants (G, H in Fig. 3) where pictorials are added to the
warning. Variant G (Fig. 3) uses the standard company warning
sign, whereas variant H (Fig. 3) has the ANSI warning triangle.
4) Providing an example: People are more likely to adhere
to a warning when they see a purpose. To provide a purpose
to this warning, we decided to design a variant (I in Fig. 3)
where an example is added at the end of the paragraph text.
The sentence is: “For example, they may change your web
browser’s web page and search settings.”
5) Signal word and signal red colour: As well as pictorial
symbols, signal words and bright colours are also considered
to be good attractors. To test this assumption, we designed the
variant (J in Fig. 3) in which the paragraph text is introduced
by the signal word “Notice” in red-coloured text. We expected
that the combination of the colour and the signal word would
catch users’ attention and stress the importance of the user
dialog.
6) Bulleted text: Since structured text is considered to be
more readable than text in a single block, we designed variant
K (Fig. 3), in which the text block is separated into bullet list.
Also, the important words in the paragraph text – “can affect
your computer’s:” are presented in a bold type.
7) Complex combinations: Finally, we also included some
more complex variants that combined or removed features of
at least three existing variants. For these variants, we do not
provide the corresponding images. In variant L, we investigated
the influence of separating the PUAs detection and LiveGrid
user dialog. We assumed that separating PUAs detection user
dialog would enhance its visibility to participants. During the
process of design, we identified a couple of variables that
we wanted to test together to amplify their strength. The
first combined variant, M, consists of a combination of text
structure (K in Fig. 3), reformulated text in options (B in
Fig. 2) and an explanatory hyperlink (D in Fig. 2). The other
combined variant N has a similar structure to M, the only
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additional change being the removal of the previous (LiveGrid)
user dialog.
8) Persuasion (not applied): For our purposes, persuasive
techniques were viewed as too biased. For example, consider
designs in which users are encouraged to update their first
password choice by adding new characters [30] – we felt
that it would be too much of a bias if a user were asked
to reconsider their first choice of choosing to disable PUAs
detection. Similarly, we considered an option whereby a user
might be encouraged to follow the decision of others (e.g., by
suggesting that “80% of other customers chose to enable PUAs
detection”), though this too was felt to be overly biased (even
though statistics would legitimately reflect previous customer
behaviour).
B. Experiment
The experiment ran in June and July 2015. We cooperated
with ESET and used their proprietary system to measure a
success rate of each variant. Since PUAs can have harmful ef-
fects, we defined our success rate as the percentage of antivirus
installations where participants enabled PUAs detection during
antivirus installation. We treated each variant as a condition
in between-subjects experiment, including our 14 new design
variants and the control one. Participants were product beta
users who installed a beta version of ESET antivirus software.
We had more than 26,000 SW installations in total, i.e. 1,755
per variant on average. Other more precise measurements, for
example one case per device, were not possible in our study
since we used the existing data collection interfaces of our
industrial partner.
Each case in our dataset represented one antivirus in-
stallation. Unfortunately, we can not detect a situation when
one same participant installed antivirus on multiple different
devices.
Concerning that we are examining a beta version of a home
end-point antivirus solution, we do not expect that many people
will behave this way. For example, administrators usually do
not install antivirus beta version across the entire site they
administer. It is also hard to detect situations where somebody
would have installed multiple times the beta version of the
ESET antivirus solution on the same device. Since we collect
for each installation the device IP address, CPU, RAM and
OS platform, we found out that cases with same values in this
attributes make only a small percentage of the whole dataset.
Each participant was randomly assigned to a variant. See
Table II for a summary of our results of performing pairwise
comparisons of each variant to the starting-point control inter-
face.
IV. FINDINGS
The control variant had a success rate 74.5%. The average
success rate of all tested variants in total is 74.7%. The highest
success rate, 89.8%, was achieved with the variant A (Fig. 2)
where the order was changed (in comparison with the starting-
point variant) – the first option is “Enable detection of PUAs.”
and the second is “Disable detection of PUAs.” The lowest
success rate was for variant J (see Fig. 3). To correct for the




A 1,796 89.8% 0.001 YES
B 1,734 72% 0.1 no
C 1,755 83.9% 0.001 YES
D 1,766 72.8% 0.25 no
E 1,749 72.6% 0.21 no
F 1,688 72.7% 0.23 no
G 1,730 73.7% 0.6 no
H 1,735 73.1% 0.35 no
I 1,818 73.3% 0.41 no
J 1,772 71.1% 0.037 no
K 1,809 71.6% 0.052 no
L 1,699 73% 0.82 no
M 1,780 72.8% 0.25 no
N 1,737 73.6% 0.57 no
TABLE II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR ALL VARIANTS. FINAL
COLUMN INDICATES WHETHER THE SUCCESS RATE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT (STATISTICALLY) FROM THE CONTROL VARIANT.
alpha error inflation resulting from multiple χ2 testing, we
used the significance level α=0.05/16=0.003 to find statistically
significant differences among variants.
A. Option order and language
Observing the ordering and language for the “Enable
detection of PUAs/Disable detection of PUAs” options, we
evaluated and compared variants A, B and C (see Fig. 2)
with the control variant (see Fig. 1). The control variant had
a success rate 74.5%, while the rate changed to 89.8% for
variant A with order changed, 72% for variant B where a
shorter, reformulated text was used with the same order of
the control variant, and 83.9% for variant C which combined
both language and order changes from the control variant.
1) Option order: We used χ2 test at the significance level
α=0.003 to find statistically significant differences among
variants that differ only in the order of options. The order of
options really matters for PUAs detection, as with other types
of warnings, e.g., [27]. We showed that users have a strong
tendency to choose the first option, irrespective of whether it
is for a positive or negative installation choice. We used the
χ2 test to compare the control variant with variant A (Fig.
2) where “Enable detection of PUAs” came first and “Disable
detection of PUAs” (χ2=143, p<0.001, df=1, r=0.2, OR=3.02)
came second. A statistically significant increase in the success
rate towards the variant with switched order was observed.
Then we used the χ2 test to compare the control variant with
variant C (Fig. 2) (χ2=48, p<0.001, df=1, r=0.116, OR=1.79),
and the result was very similar. Our subjects were more likely
to pick the first option they were offered.
When we merged the results from the two variants, where
the first option is positive (variants A and C) into one, and by
a similar process we made with two variants, where the first
option was formulated negatively (B and control), we used the
χ2 test and we found out that the position on the first place is
a very strong aspect to influence the user to pick the preferred
option (χ2=206, p<0.001, df=1, r=0.171, OR=0.412).
2) Option language: Considering the option text language,
the formulation “Enable detection of PUAs” (A in Fig. 2) has a
higher influence (χ2=27, p<0.001, df=1, r=0.087, OR=0.592)
on users than “Detect PUAs” (C in Fig. 2), though both
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offer the option for enabling detection first. This difference
is statistically significant.
In contrast, the control variant compared with variant B
is not statistically significant (χ2=2.66, p=0.1, df=1, r=0.027,
OR=0.882).
B. Warning image
According to previous research, a warning picture would
catch the user’s attention and would increase the success rate
more than the control variant [25]. We compared the variant
without the pictorial symbols (the control one) and with the
pictorial (G in Fig. 3) – the company’s warning sign (χ2=0.27,
p=0.6, df=1, r=0.009, OR=0.96), we observed that there is
no significant difference in user behaviour. Similarly, when
doing a comparison between the control variant and variant
H (Fig. 3) with the ANSI warning triangle (χ2=0.87, p=0.35,
df=1, r=0.016, OR=0.93), no statistically significant difference
is observed.
Finally, we compared both variants with the pictorial
symbol (χ2=0.17, p=0.68, df=1, r=0.007, OR=0.969). There
is no significant difference in use of the standardized ANSI
pictorial or the company’s own warning sign.
C. Coloured warning text
We chose the red signal colour in combination with the
warning word “Notice”. Both the use of a red colour and
warning text has previously shown to be a good attractor [24].
Thus, we had expected that this attractor would increase the
success rate. However, when comparing the “Notice” variant
(J in Fig. 3) with the control variant (χ2=5.06, p=0.024, df=1,
r=0.037, OR=0.843), we found that the variant with “Notice”
had no significant effect on the success rate from the control
variant. This variant has the lowest success rate 71.1% from
all variants (the control has 74.5%). One possible explanation
for this result may be that some users misinterpreted the
red colour as a warning to not add the PUAs detection
feature, and thus clicked on the first option (“Disable detection
of potentially unwanted applications’). This possibility also
supports previous work on SSL warnings. Bravo-Lillo et al.
improved SSL warnings adherence by stressing important parts
by adding contrast color [19]. Despite the fact that this variant
did not have best performance, still was better than the control
one. Felt et al. [28] used signal color in warning design and
significantly improved adherence of SSL warning. But both
used “safe option” as the first option, whereas the safe option
in our case was the second.
V. OTHER FINDINGS
A. Hyperlink
1) Text in a hyperlink: We were curious whether partic-
ipants would be interested in more information and would
be more likely to enable the PUAs detection in the variant
that contains a hyperlink to the explanatory webpage. We also
tested two variants of a descriptive hyperlink text. Current re-
search considers explanation to be a bad attractor; on the other
hand, users are more likely to behave securely if they see a
purpose to this behaviour. We tested two possible formulations
of this link. The company’s question mark pictorial symbol is
appended to both sentences. The first is “Why do we ask?” (E
in Fig. 2) and the second is “What is a potentially unwanted
application?” (D in Fig. 2). We observed that there is abso-
lutely no difference in user behaviour when formulations differ.
(χ2=0.01, p=0.92, df=1, r=0.001, OR=1.00). Unfortunately,
our industry partner couldn’t provide us information whether
users clicked on the hyperlink.
2) Hyperlink and no description: We expected that the
version with the explanatory paragraph text (the control one)
would increase the success rate more than the version without
the explanatory paragraph text, but with a hyperlink only (F).
The χ2 test proved that there is no statistically significant
difference between the variant with the explanatory paragraph
text (the control variant) and the variant without explanatory
text, only with the hyperlink following to the company’s
web page with detailed explanation (χ2=1.41, p=0.23, df=1,
r=0.02, OR=0.912).
B. Providing an example
We expected that the variant with the PUA example explic-
itly mentioned (I) in the text would increase the success rate
over the control variant, because participants would see the
purpose of PUAs detection clearly. Despite our expectations,
providing the example in a bold type did not significantly
improve the success rate (χ2=0.67, p=0.41, df=1, r=0.013,
OR=0.939).
C. Text structure
We decided to structure the paragraph with the explanatory
text into bullet points to enhance its readability and text
comprehension. Since structured text is more readable by
participants, we expected also an improvement in the success
rate over the control variant. The very unexpected result was
that the variant with the structured text (K in Fig. 3) has
the second lowest success rate 71.6% and we observed no
significant difference in comparison with the control variant
with an unstructured text (χ2=3.7, p=0.052, df=1, r=0.032,
OR=0.863).
D. Complex combinations
We expected that the variant without the previous LiveGrid
user dialog (L in Fig. 3) would be more effective, as it would
catch the user’s attention better and increase the success rate.
Comparing the control variant with the corresponding variant
without the previous LiveGrid question (χ2=0.05, p=0.82,
df=1, r=0.003, OR=0.928), we observed no difference in user
behaviour.
We expected that the variant with a combination of several
principles would increase the user success rate more than vari-
ants with only one aspect used. Comparing the control variant
with the “combined variant” (M in Fig. 3) that contained
structured text, the hyperlink and a shorter text in options
(χ2=1.355, p=0.25, df=1, r=0.019, OR=0.915), no significant
change in user behaviour was observed.
The combination of four aspects (N in Fig. 3) (a structured
text, a hyperlink, a shorter option text and previous user
dialog removal) also did not lead to significant improvements
(χ2=0.32, p=0.57, df=1, r=0.009, OR=0.957) in comparison
with the control variant.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We conducted our user experiment in the unexplored
area of the acceptability of potentially unwanted applications
(PUAs). PUAs are notoriously difficult to manage, e.g., legal
challenges can preclude default options that could otherwise be
set for PUAs detection or removal. Our large-scale experiment
was completed with 26,000 SW installations. It was conducted
in cooperation with antivirus product beta version users of
the IT security software provider ESET. Drawing on previous
security warning literature, we tested the impact of 15 warning
screen variations for their ability to encourage participants
to enable PUAs detection during the process of antivirus
installation.
Starting with the control variant, we determined that 74.5%
of participants wanted to enable PUAs detection. Further,
from our 15 variants, we obtained an even larger percentage
by presenting a positive option first (for enabling the PUAs
detection), resulting in a statistically significant increase to
89.8% adherence (an increase of 15.3 percentage points).
This best variant also has the highest effect size (odds ratio)
3.02. Further research will be needed to evaluate user trust
level towards security products and his behaviour during its
installation.
The remaining variants, covering effects such as warning
images, bolding, red-coloured “Notice” and simplified warning
text were surprising for not providing any increase in the
number of participants who enabled PUAs detection. Odds
ratios in this cases were around 0.9. In fact, the use of a
signal word Notice in a contrasting red colour resulted in the
lowest success rate 71.1%. While the results about the order
of options may not seem that surprising, the variability of
success between all options, some of which we would have
also expected an increase, e.g., option J (coloured warning text)
is very surprising, especially given the previous positive effects
of these warning techniques, e.g., for SSL warning adherence.
The main conclusion from our results is that the order
of available options is crucial. The design change with the
greatest impact in a limited design space is to simply put the
“safe option” in the first place.
Our study focuses only on the behavior of beta users. It
could be enhanced by collecting statistics about clicking on
hyperlinks in variants D, E and F and also by more precise
distinction between multiple installations under single user
credentials in our dataset. This was not possible in the current
study as we used the existing data collection interfaces of our
industry partner.
In future work, there are a number of areas for potential
improvement and further advancement. We plan to perform a
similar evaluation on a more diverse set of participants (e.g.,
not only beta users, but also real product users), and also
to collect further data, including qualitative feedback from
participants. We also plan to investigate more on antivirus users
demography and security and privacy attitudes.
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Fig. 3. Variants G-K.
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